{"id":5572,"date":"2026-01-05T13:39:54","date_gmt":"2026-01-05T13:39:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/thetradingdictionary.com\/index.php\/2026\/01\/05\/gordon-sondland-trumps-realpolitik-may-be-the-only-way-to-end-the-ukraine-war\/"},"modified":"2026-01-05T13:39:54","modified_gmt":"2026-01-05T13:39:54","slug":"gordon-sondland-trumps-realpolitik-may-be-the-only-way-to-end-the-ukraine-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thetradingdictionary.com\/index.php\/2026\/01\/05\/gordon-sondland-trumps-realpolitik-may-be-the-only-way-to-end-the-ukraine-war\/","title":{"rendered":"GORDON SONDLAND: Trump\u2019s realpolitik may be the only way to end the Ukraine war"},"content":{"rendered":"

For three years, the Washington foreign policy establishment has insisted that there is only one acceptable outcome in Ukraine: total victory over Russia achieved through relentless military aid, indefinite financial support and escalation readiness regardless of the risks. But strategy and morality are not always the same thing \u2014 and real leadership demands confronting reality as it exists, not as we wish it to be.<\/p>\n

I write this not as an academic or pundit, but as someone who worked at the center of this conflict. As U.S. ambassador to the European Union during the first Trump administration, President Donald Trump tasked me with bringing Europe into alignment \u2014 truly into alignment \u2014 behind Ukraine. <\/p>\n

That meant ending the EU\u2019s habitual double-game: proclaiming solidarity with Kyiv while enriching Moscow through energy purchases and dragging its feet on serious sanctions. I saw firsthand how Europe\u2019s hesitation and transactional approach sent Moscow exactly the wrong message. It told President Vladimir Putin the West was divided, unserious and ultimately unwilling to sacrifice comfort for principle. That perception was part of his calculus.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

The uncomfortable truth is that the United States is closer to strategic exhaustion than our rhetoric admits. Europe\u2019s defense industries remain underbuilt. American stockpiles are finite. And while Russia has paid a staggering price, it has not collapsed, surrendered or reversed course. Worse, every escalation increases the probability of something unthinkable: a desperate Kremlin resorting to tactical nuclear weapons. That would not be ‘just another step’ on the escalatory ladder; it would fundamentally shatter global stability.<\/p>\n

Against that background, the Trump administration\u2019s instinct to seek a quasi-business resolution is not weakness. It is classic realpolitik \u2014 recognition that the job of American leadership is to maximize U.S. security, economic leverage and strategic flexibility while minimizing existential risk.<\/p>\n

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Business leaders know what Washington too often does not: the perfect deal rarely exists. The question is not whether we can achieve a morally pure resolution; it is whether we can lock in outcomes that are measurably better for American interests \u2014 and for Ukraine \u2014 than a perpetual, bleeding stalemate.<\/p>\n

A negotiated settlement, backed by enforceable conditions and leverage, could do precisely that.<\/p>\n

First, a settlement can provide Ukraine with a bespoke security guarantee \u2014 credible enough to deter renewed aggression but structured to avoid NATO Article 5 entanglement. This isn\u2019t a vague promise; it is a contract with clear performance terms. The U.S. guarantee would stand as long as Russia adheres to its commitments. But if Russia violates the agreement, the snapback provisions would trigger instantly \u2014 not months later, not after diplomatic waffling \u2014 immediately unlocking full-scale U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine, including offensive weapons, advanced air defense, training and intelligence integration.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Just as important, the consequences of Russian cheating would be explicit, not theoretical.<\/p>\n

If Moscow breaks the deal, the United States would reserve the option to openly back Ukraine in retaking every inch of territory \u2014 up to and including restoration to its pre-2014 borders. Moscow would know this going in. Deterrence works best when penalties are unmistakable.<\/p>\n

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And crucially, this would all be public. No more pretending, hedging or quiet back-channel shipments. The world \u2014 and Russia \u2014 would know that renewed aggression automatically and lawfully unleashes overwhelming Western support, with the U.S. leading confidently and unapologetically. That clarity is a deterrent in itself.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Equally important, this structure protects U.S. sovereignty in the agreement. If Ukraine violates its obligations, the American guarantee becomes void at our sole discretion. Not a bureaucratic process. Not a committee vote. The United States decides. That means Ukraine has every incentive to maintain discipline and treat the arrangement not as a blank check, but as a powerful partnership grounded in responsibility.<\/p>\n

Second, a negotiated deal can generate tangible U.S. economic advantage. Ukraine holds minerals and rare earths essential to American industry, national security and technological supremacy. China knows this. Russia knows this. Only Washington\u2019s old guard pretends resource control is not strategic policy. A structured agreement ensuring privileged U.S. access strengthens manufacturing, energy resilience, and economic security.<\/p>\n

Third, a settlement can wedge open the relationship between Moscow and Beijing. Right now, the war has pushed Russia completely into China\u2019s arms. That alignment is bad for the United States and for global balance. A disciplined settlement begins unwinding that dependency. America doesn\u2019t need friendship with Moscow; it needs leverage over it. Realpolitik is about advantage, not affection.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Fourth, a deal can compartmentalize strategic theaters. If Russia insists on regional influence, the U.S. can demand reciprocal space in our hemisphere \u2014 particularly in Venezuela, narcotics interdiction, and energy-linked criminal networks \u2014 reducing adversarial reach in the Americas.<\/p>\n

Critics will scream ‘Munich.’ They always do. But Adolf Hitler was leading a rising ideological empire bent on global conquest. Russia is a demographically and economically declining power seeking regional positioning. Brutal, yes \u2014 but not irrational. Mature powers negotiate with rivals when negotiations produce superior outcomes.<\/p>\n

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Others claim any deal rewards aggression. That assumes deterrence is binary \u2014 victory or failure. In reality, deterrence is layered.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

A settlement that leaves Russia bloodied, sanctioned, strategically constrained and facing automatic, overwhelming Western military escalation \u2014 potentially including U.S. support for Ukraine restoring its 2013 borders \u2014 if it cheats is not a reward. It is a warning carved into treaty stone.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, the humanitarian and financial realities matter. Endless war means endless dead Ukrainians, shattered cities and endless U.S. taxpayer exposure with no defined victory condition. That may thrill think tanks that never fight wars, but it is not serious governance.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Most importantly, a business-style settlement introduces accountability \u2014 currently absent from Washington\u2019s ‘as long as it takes’ mantra. Under a structured deal, compliance is measurable. Triggers are automatic. Support is not improvised \u2014 it is guaranteed. Enforcement is not theoretical \u2014 it is built in. And unlike today, America would no longer need to whisper its involvement. It would act openly, decisively and with treaty authority.<\/p>\n

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The alternative? A forever war with rising nuclear risk, continued strategic drift, and deepening alignment between Russia and China. That is not strategy. It is inertia dressed as courage.<\/p>\n

Realpolitik does not abandon values. It protects them intelligently. A disciplined, enforceable settlement \u2014 with clear snapback provisions benefiting both the U.S. and Ukraine; explicit authority to openly arm Ukraine and potentially support full territorial restoration if Russia cheats; and a guarantee revocable at America\u2019s sole discretion if Ukraine violates terms \u2014 is not capitulation.<\/p>\n

It is strategic control.<\/p>\n

In geopolitics, as in business, the strongest player is not the one who insists on endless confrontation. It is the one who knows when to fight \u2014 and when to close the deal.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

This post appeared first on FOX NEWS<\/div>\n

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For three years, the Washington foreign policy establishment has insisted that there is only one acceptable outcome in Ukraine: total victory over Russia achieved through relentless military aid, indefinite financial support and escalation readiness regardless of the risks. But strategy and morality are not always the same thing \u2014 and real leadership demands confronting reality…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":5573,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5572","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-world-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetradingdictionary.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5572","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetradingdictionary.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetradingdictionary.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetradingdictionary.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetradingdictionary.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5572"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/thetradingdictionary.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5572\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetradingdictionary.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5573"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetradingdictionary.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5572"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetradingdictionary.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5572"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetradingdictionary.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5572"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}